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Abstract: In a recent article, Wundrack et al. (2018) put forward an elaborate and intriguing hypothesis
on enhanced perspective-taking (Theory of Mind) ability as a consequence of higher personality state
variability. While there is evidence in favor of this hypothesis, the clinical examples of bipolar disorder
and borderline personality disorder, as highlighted by the authors, demonstrate that a high state
variability can also be accompanied by a lower perspective-taking ability (as commonly observed in
these disorders). We suggest that only those state changes which are initiated on a voluntary basis
and are accompanied by self-awareness go along with a higher perspective-taking ability. Introducing
self-awareness as a moderating factor might help explain seemingly conflicting findings related to the
hypothesis proposed in the target article. Moreover, we argue that the direction of causality proposed
in the target article is not the only conceivable one, and perspective-taking ability could also be a
cause, not just a consequence, of personality state variability. Finally, we provide suggestions on how
these hypotheses could be tested in future studies.
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Wundrack et al. [1] put forward an intriguing hypothesis on gains in perspective-taking ability as
a consequence of state changes in personality dimensions. They argued that experiencing a greater
variety of different personality states—in terms of the varying expressions of affective, cognitive, and
behavioral patterns associated with certain personality dimensions—leads to a greater likelihood of
ego-dispersion, i.e., a reduction of egocentric bias, and perspective pooling, i.e., adjustment to someone
else’s perspective.
This hypothesis is not only conceptually well-founded and appealing, but also supported by
recent empirical evidence. Böckler et al. [2] reported that a three-month “inner parts” intervention
increases perspective-taking (used here synonymously with Theory of Mind (ToM) for training effects,
see also [3,4]). During the intervention, participants were asked to identify their inner parts, which
can be thought of as “relatively discrete subpersonalities which are each characterized by specific
affective, cognitive, and behavioral patterns” [2] (p. 199). Examples for these parts are for instance
the inner critic or the inner protector [5], which can be thought of as variances in the personality
dimension of antagonism/agreeableness. Interestingly, the number of inner parts that were identified
by participants in the course of the training directly related to increases in ToM performance in terms of
understanding others mental states. This can be interpreted as evidence for the mechanism proposed
in the target article, as it shows that experiencing variation in personality dimensions was accompanied
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by increases in ToM performance. Though the study design focused on inner state changes rather than
state changes evoked by different external situations, the associated experiences are real in that they go
along with different patterns of affect, cognition, and behavior just as state changes in the outer world.
It is noteworthy that state changes were performed on a voluntary, conscious basis in this study, as
participants actively tried to switch and take the perspectives of their different personality parts.
As also noted in the target article, not all state variability is accompanied by increased ToM
performance. Specifically, the clinical examples of bipolar disorder and borderline personality disorder
highlighted by the authors show that high state variability—as evident in bipolar disorder and
borderline personality disorder—can also be accompanied by reduced, not heightened ToM (for
meta-analyses, see [6,7]). Here, it needs to be noted that for the latter example, borderline personality
disorder, the effects are more heterogeneous than for bipolar disorder, and might depend on the used
ToM measure. Studies using emotion recognition ability as a proxy for ToM find an intact [8] or
even elevated ability [7,9] in borderline personality disorder. However, individuals with borderline
personality disorder display lower ToM in complex, real-life ToM tasks [7,8,10], which arguably have
the highest ecological validity. ToM deficits in borderline personality disorder can, depending on
emotional arousal, result from overmentalizing (excessive, but incorrect mentalizing) [10–12] or also
under- or nonmentalizing under high arousal [13]. In bipolar disorder, undermentalizing seems to be
the primary cause of reduced ToM performance [14].
Given that both bipolar disorder and borderline personality disorder can be viewed as extremes
of general, non-pathological variation [15,16] (see also [17]), we believe a crucial and central question
is how more state variability can go along with a lower perspective-taking ability. These examples
partially challenge the hypothesis proposed in the target article as they point to the necessity of
introducing moderating factors under which state changes lead to ToM enhancement.
We suggest that whether or not state variability is accompanied by increased perspective-taking
might depend on whether or not state changes are initiated on a voluntary and conscious basis.
State variability is commonly not experienced as voluntary by patients with bipolar or borderline
personality disorder. On the contrary, these patients experience being at the mercy of inner or outer
forces that determine their patterns of experience and behavior, which manifests in reduced cognitive
control [18–20] and emotional regulation [21,22] as well as increased impulsivity [23] in these disorders.
For bipolar disorder, reduced cognitive control is at the same time discussed as a potential mechanism
of reduced ToM performance [24].
Volition in itself, however, cannot explain why some state changes are accompanied by ToM
increases whereas others are not. Involuntary state changes could serve ego-dispersion and perspective
pooling as well. Voluntary state changes may, however, be accompanied by self-awareness, which
might be crucial to the deliberate experience of different personality states. Self-awareness, defined
as becoming the object of one’s own attention [25], can vary between different states, but can also
be habitually high or low, therefore becoming a trait itself (also referred to as private and public
self-consciousness) [26]. While habitually high self-awareness is not associated per se with desirable
or undesirable psychological characteristics (and can take the form of both, reflection or rumination
concerning the private self [27] or acquisitive and protective self-monitoring concerning the public
self [28–30]), habitually low self-awareness might be indicative of disorders characterized by reduced
personality functioning (i.e., reduced self and other-related mental functioning [31]).
Indeed, different aspects of self-awareness are known to be reduced in bipolar disorder [32] and
borderline personality disorder [33,34]. The lower degree of self-awareness during state changes in
these disorders might explain why these changes may not be accompanied by ego-dispersion and
perspective pooling—the processes hypothesized to underlie ToM increases—in these cases. State
changes that are of a primarily reflexive (i.e., automatic, low awareness), not a reflective (voluntary, high
awareness) nature, might be of little benefit to ego-dispersion or perspective pooling, as they do not
include conscious self-insights such as “right now, I am feeling and behaving differently than just
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before”. We think this is well in line with the author’s (positive) definition of ego-dispersion as “the
general awareness of the transiency of your own perspective” [1] (p. 50).
If we now integrate the previously mentioned findings of Böckler and colleagues [2] with the idea
that only state changes accompanied by self-awareness go along with ego-dispersion and perspective
pooling—which are hypothesized to underlie ToM enhancement—it could be speculated that the
direction of causality assumed by Wundrack et al. [1] is not the only possible direction. Indeed,
taking the idea of inner perspective changes one step further, it could be hypothesized that the
perspective-taking ability cannot only be a consequence but also an antecedent of higher reflective
(voluntary and self-aware) state variability. It might be the case that perspective-taking ability acts as a
facilitator of switching between different experiential and behavioral patterns, which then manifests in
terms of personality state changes. The capacity to mentally simulate different personality states might
thus also precede changes in observable behavior.
The idea that perspective-taking can lead to state changes is supported by recent evidence
from Gilead et al. [35]. In this study, participants were instructed to take the perspective of either
an emotionally “sensitive” or “tough” individual. Participants subsequent emotional and neural
responses to affective pictures were in line with the emotional state of the imagined individual, that
is, reduced reactivity if participants took the perspective of the “tough” person. This suggests that
voluntary perspective-taking, in terms of a simulation of others mental states, can lead to an alteration
in their own experiences in the direction of these states. The process is very close if not identical to
perspective pooling as proposed in the target article, with the exception that the causal direction is
reversed in this case. The result of this process is, in this case, dispersed egocentricity. Interestingly,
neuroscience research also shows that metacognitive ability in ToM (i.e., the evaluation of one’s own
ToM performance) is associated with activity in parts of the ToM network itself, which suggests that
the awareness of perspective-taking processes may be an intrinsic and vital part of perspective-taking
ability [36].
If perspective-taking can also be a cause, not just a consequence, of behavioral variability, this
might also explain the seemingly paradoxical findings for patients with bipolar or borderline personality
disorder. As perspective-taking ability is, as discussed above, typically lower in these individuals, they
might experience little control over different personality states, leaving them with high variability at
low self-awareness. In line with this, therapeutic interventions for borderline patients were designed
specifically to increase perspective-taking as part of general mentalizing ability [37].
For future studies investigating the mutual relations between personality state variability and
perspective-taking ability, two suggestions may be derived from the presented considerations. First,
self-awareness could be considered as a moderating intra-or interindividual (depending on the research
design; see below) difference variable. Intraindividual differences could, for instance, be assessed using
the situational self-awareness scale [38], interindividual differences could be assessed using items in
the trait of self-awareness in terms of reflection [27] or also via conceptually related broader traits such
as mindfulness (for a review of scales, see [39]). As noted in the target article, self-monitoring in terms
of an awareness of the public self might also play a role in controlled personality state variability [1].
From the considerations presented here, it follows that the relation between personality state variability
and ToM performance should be stronger in individuals who display high self-awareness.
This, however, does not speak to the causality of effects, which brings us to the second point.
Since state variability in real-life settings can hardly be experimentally varied to investigate causal
relationships (though ToM could be experimentally varied by means of training, as noted in the target
article), longitudinal, quasi-experimental studies could investigate cross-lagged effects to estimate
the relative mutual influences among personality state variability and perspective-taking. To this
end, perspective-taking could be assessed using naturalistic, complex ToM tasks, as discussed above
(though such research is complicated by the fact that these cannot be repeated at will, up to four
measurements were already used in prior studies [3]), social inference tasks [40], as proposed in the
target article, or self-reports of perspective-taking in real situations (as in empathy research [41]).
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These could be combined with subjective and objective assessments of personality states (including
situational self-awareness) using Ecological Momentary Assessment. We wish to emphasize that the
suggestions provided here can be seen as possible extensions to the research program proposed by
Wundrack et al. [1], which might be helpful in broadening the scope of the proposed hypothesis. Still,
the research outlined in the target article appears to be an important first step, from our point of view.
Taken together, the hypothesis proposed in the article by Wundrack et al. [1] is a highly innovative
approach to explain interindividual variability in perspective-taking capabilities. It not only possesses
face validity, but is also supported by first empirical evidence. We propose here that self-awareness
might be an important moderating factor that determines whether or not higher personality state
variability might go along with an increased perspective-taking ability and the direction of causality
implied might not be the only conceivable one. Indeed, both causal pathways seem plausible based
on past research on perspective-taking and behavioral variability. Longitudinal studies employing
Ecological Momentary Assessment could provide insights into the causal nature of the hypothesized
relations and their putative mutual interplay. Varying degrees of volition and associated self-awareness
might moderate the association between state changes and perspective-taking.
Conflicts of Interest: The authors declare no conflict of interest.
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